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ADB Asian Development Bank
CBM Central Bank of Myanmar
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CSO Civil Society Organisation
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FFSS Free Funeral Service Society
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IFC International Finance Corporation
IMF International Monetary Fund
   ISL Institute for Societal Leadership
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
KIO Kachin Independence Organization
KNLA Karen National Liberation Army
NLD National League for Democracy
ODA Official Development Assistance
PSRD Press Scrutiny and Registration Division
RSO Rohingya Solidarity Organisation
SEE State Economic Enterprise
SEZ Special Economic Zone
SIO Social Impact Organisation
SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council
SME Small-Medium Enterprise
SMU Singapore Management University
SPDC State Peace and Development Council 
 UN United Nations
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III. About the Country Insights Lab Series 
The Institute for Societal Leadership conducted a series of eleven Country Insights 
Labs (CILs) in select Southeast Asian cities between June 2014 and June 2015. 
Each CIL aimed to uncover the critical social and environmental issues facing 
leaders from business, government and civil society in a given country and frame 
the underlying causes behind each issue within the country’s context. The study 
identified emerging trends in Southeast Asia and has since directed further re-
search toward interconnected social and environmental issues shared among 
countries in the region. 
Additionally, ISL research staff investigated the day-to-day organisational chal-
lenges faced by social impact organisations (SIOs) in each Southeast Asian coun-
try. We broadly defined an SIO as any organisation with the capacity to contribute 
to the betterment of communities. These included, but were not limited to, phil-
anthropic organisations, corporate foundations, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), activist groups, social enterprises and impact investors. Interviews fo-
cussed on challenges associated with funding models, human resources, tax in-
centives, legal frameworks and government registration processes. In total, re-
search staff interviewed 237 organisations and 293 individuals, including govern-
ment officials, business leaders, philanthropists, NGO workers, social entrepre-
neurs, media professionals and academics. The interviews themselves consisted of 
questions relating to organisational history, operations, strategic outlook, cross-
sector collaboration, leadership and country context.  1
The Institute did not intend the CIL series to be exhaustive or to produce statisti-
cally significant data. On the contrary, the series was a qualitative study that em-
ployed interviews and market insights as a means of understanding an increasing-
ly complex landscape. As one of the world’s most diverse regions, Southeast Asia 
is home to an array of cultures, languages, religions and economic levels of devel-
opment. At the cornerstone of each country study is a belief that workable solu-
tions and partnerships depend on an awareness of how each country’s unique 
context relates to its social issues. 
The ISL research team conducted interviews in Yangon between 17–19 August 
2014 and 15–17 September 2014. 
 For a list of sample questions, see section VI. 1
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Myanmar (Burma) 
A. Historical Background 
Since its independence from British rule in 1948, 
Myanmar has struggled with multiple obstacles, 
including a series of violent internal ethnic and 
sectarian conflicts, isolationist fiscal policies insti-
tuted by an increasingly distrustful military gov-
ernment and international sanctions and con-
demnation following government crackdowns in 
1988 and 2007. In spite of all these setbacks, 
President Thein Sein’s decision in 2011 to liber-
alise the country’s political and economic systems 
has created a new wave of optimism for what was 
once commonly regarded as a failed state. 
  
Myanmar is home to one of the world’s longest 
running civil wars, with hostilities simmering for 
well over a half-century.  At independence, Prime 2
Minister U Nu’s civilian government inherited a 
country still reeling from its experience during 
World War II and equipped with a decentralised 
colonial system that treated each of Burma’s  di3 -
verse ethnic groups as separate political entities. 
The British had co-opted local ethnic minorities 
and hill tribes into the colonial civil service and 
military, which bred ill-feeling among the majority 
Bamar, many of whom sided with the Japanese 
occupation during the Second World War. As U 
Nu and the primarily Bamar government attempt-
ed to forge a unified polity post-independence, 
tensions and war memories boiled over. In addi-
tion to putting down communist insurgencies and 
repelling Kuomintang incursions, Myanmar’s mili-
tary, the Tatmadaw, has at various times since in-
dependence been at war with separatists militias 
made up of ethnic Chins, Kachins, Karens, Mons, 
Palaungs, Shans and Was. Fighting has also at 
times been sectarian in nature, with Rohingya 
Muslims, Buddhist Rakhines and the army period-
ically engaging each other in western Rakhine 
State. 
The instability and militarisation of Burma in its 
fledgling years crippled the U Nu administration 
and paved the way for military takeover. A 1962 
coup brought the Tatmadaw to power for the long 
term. Under the “Burmese Way to Socialism,” 
General Ne Win nationalised close to 15,000 pri-
vate firms and established a massive collection of 
“State Economic Enterprises” (SEEs). As part of 
the British Empire, colonial Burma had attracted 
large communities of Indian and Chinese mer-
chants, who together constituted the country's 
up-and-coming middle class. Ne Win’s initial 
seizure of local businesses forced approximately 
200,000 ethnic Indians to flee Burma.  Maoist 4
encroachments in the mid-1960s provided an 
additional excuse to appropriate Chinese-owned 
businesses. Foreign investment during this period 
ground to a halt. Between 1962 and 1988, Ne 
Win’s isolationist economic policies yielded slug-
gish growth, widened income disparities and in-
curred US$3.4 billion in government debt.  Once 5
the “rice bowl of Asia,” with grain exports exceed-
ing 1.7 million tons, Myanmar’s agricultural pro-
duction had contracted by 90 percent within a 
decade of the 1962 coup.  In 1987, the UN 6
placed Burma on its list of "least developed coun-
tries.” 
In spite of Ne Win’s decision to step down in 
1988, Burma’s economy shrunk further when sev-
eral foreign governments, including West Ger-
many, the United States and Japan, withdrew offi-
 For an overview of Burma’s civil war post-independence, see Michael Charney, A History of Modern Burma (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni2 -
versity Press, 2009), 72–92.
 The government changed the country's official name to Myanmar in 1989. All discussion of Myanmar before 1989 will refer to the country 3
as Burma.
 Maureen Aung-Thwin and Thant Myint-U, ‘The Burmese Way to Socialism’, 3rd World Quarterly 13.1 (1992): 73–74.4
 Barbara Crossette, ‘Exhausted Burma Struggles in Isolation’, New York Times, 23 March 1987, accessed 17 October 2014, http://www.ny5 -
times.com/1987/03/23/world/exhausted-burma-struggles-in-isolation.html.
 Richard Pomfret, ‘ASEAN’s New Frontiers: Integrating the Newest Members into the ASEAN Economic Community’, Asian Economic Policy 6
Review 8 (2013), 30.
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cial development assistance (ODA) in response to 
violent crackdowns on student protestors. The 
post-Ne Win State Law and Order Restoration 
Council (SLORC) and its successor, the State 
Peace and Development Council (SPDC), also 
refused to honour the 1990 election of Aung San 
Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), 
leading to additional economic sanctions but also 
piecemeal liberalisations as the Tatmadaw scram-
bled to make up the windfall. Although the gov-
ernment signed deals with several Thai firms in 
the 1990s and 2000s, conducting business in 
Myanmar continued to be notoriously difficult 
during this period. Despite rosy double digits 
posted by the government, independent ob-
servers have estimated that GDP growth in 
Myanmar was only 2–3 percent between 1988 
and 2010.   7
Meanwhile, the military government drew both 
headlines and additional sanctions when it vio-
lently broke up Buddhist clergy and protestors 
involved in the pro-democracy “Saffron Revolu-
tion” in August 2007. The following year, in-
ternational relief organisations also criticised the 
government’s delayed response to Cyclone Nar-
 Sean Turnell, ‘Fundamentals of Myanmar’s Macroeconomy: A Political Economy Perspective’, Asian Economic Policy Review 6 (2011), 137–7
38.
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Myanmar By Numbers
Official Name: Republic of the Union of Myanmar (1989–present)
Capital: Nay Pyi Taw (2006–present) 
Area: 676,578 sq km
Population: 55.75 million (country); 4.46 million (Yangon)
Ethnic Groups: Bamar (68%), Shan (9%), Karen (7%), Rakhine (4%), 
Chinese (3%), Indian (2%), Mon (2%), Other (5%)
Religion: Buddhist (89%), Christian (4%), Muslim (4%), 
Animist (1%), Other (2%) 
Language: Burmese (official), but minority ethnic groups speak 
their own languages
 
Currency: Myanmar Kyat 
GDP (PPP): US$111.1 billion [2013 est.]
GDP Per Capita (PPP): US$1,700 [2013 est.; lowest in Southeast Asia]
GDP Real Growth Rate: 6.8% [2013 est.]
Labour Force: Agriculture (70%), Industry (7%), Services (23%)
Literacy: 92.7% (whole); 95.1% (male); 90.4% (female)
Life Expectancy: 65.94 years (whole); 63.57 years (male); 68.46 years 
(female) [2014 est., 3rd lowest in Southeast Asia]
Source: CIA World Factbook (www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/)
gis, which killed over 138,000 Burmese and dis-
placed an additional 2.4 million.  8
President Thein Sein’s decision in 2011 to dissolve 
the military junta has opened up new opportuni-
ties and challenges for Myanmar. Initial reforms 
have included easing censorship laws, appointing 
an anti-corruption committee, opening the 2012 
by-election to opposition parties and releasing 
political prisoners, including opposition leader 
Aung San Suu Kyi. As of this writing, the U.S. State 
Department estimates that the government has 
released some 1,300 political prisoners, but main-
tains that 30 to 40 political prisoners still remain in 
the country’s jails.  Throughout 2012 and 2013, 9
Myanmar’s national assembly, the Hluttaw, has 
continued to introduce new legislation at a brisk 
pace, including laws addressing food standards, 
the national census, consumer protection, water 
supply, minimum wage and disability rights. For 
the first time in fifty years, opposition members 
were allowed to hold seats in the national assem-
bly.  
The initial success of the above reforms has bol-
stered investor confidence in what is widely seen 
as an emerging market. To date, the European 
Union, the United States and Canada have largely 
rolled back economic sanctions, paving the way 
for increased foreign investment, loans and de-
velopment aid. Along with significant investments 
made by China, South Korea, Japan and Singa-
pore, cumulative foreign direct investment in 
Myanmar reached an unprecedented US$44 bil-
lion in December 2013.  10
B. Current Challenges 
Myanmar currently faces a number of political, 
economic and social developments. Political lib-
eralisation and easing of business restrictions 
have created economic windfalls in telecommuni-
cations, banking and heavy industries. At the 
same time, they have also reignited age-old com-
petition for resources throughout the country, 
especially in the Rakhine and Kachin States. The 
2012 and 2013 political reforms have been suc-
cessful to a limited extent, but there have been 
hints of a slowdown amid the ongoing constitu-
tional review. Several high-profile cases have also 
tested the government's sincerity with its newly-
instituted media regulations. 
❖ An ongoing mobile telecommunications boom. 
Providing Myanmar’s 55 million people with cellu-
lar phones, mobile telecommunications services 
and Internet represents a market opportunity of 
enormous proportions. After North Korea, Myan-
mar has the lowest mobile network penetration in 
the world. According to a study commissioned by 
Swedish telecommunications provider Ericsson, 
only one million Burmese owned mobile phones 
and less than 400,000 had access to Internet as 
recently as 2012. Ericsson also estimated that 
over the next three years Myanmar’s telecommu-
nication industry could be worth up to US$6.54 
billion, or 7.4 percent of GDP.   11
The Hluttaw recently passed legislation in Octo-
ber 2013 opening the telecommunication indus-
try, once a government monopoly, to foreign 
companies. In August 2014, Qatari provider 
Ooredoo launched the first independent mobile 
phone network in the country. It will be followed 
by Norway’s Telenor Group and a joint venture 
between KDDI Corp, Sumitomo and the former 
government concession, Myanmar Posts & 
Telecommunications (MPT). Together, KDDI and 
Sumitomo have pledged US$2 billion to develop 
Myanmar’s telecommunication networks. The en-
try of foreign telecommunication providers her-
alds the revolutionising of Myanmar’s economy. 
SIM cards, once valued as much as 500,000 kyats 
(US$500) and restricted to government shops, are 
 Voravit Suwanvanichkij et al., ’Community-based assessment of human rights in a complex humanitarian emergency: the Emergency As8 -
sistance Teams-Burma and Cyclone Nargis’, Conflict and Health 4 (2010), 9, accessed 17 October 2014, http://www.conflictandhealth.com/
content/4/1/8.
 Aung Hla Tun and Jared Ferrie, ‘Myanmar says it will release more than 3,000 prisoners’, Reuters, 7 October 2014, accessed 17 October 9
2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/10/07/uk-myanmar-prisoners-release-idUKKCN0HW0ID20141007.
 Maetrii Aung-Thwin, “Myanmar in 2013: Integration and the Challenge of Reform,” Southeast Asian Affairs (2014): 205–6.10
 The Potential Economic Impact of Mobile Communications in Myanmar (Stockholm: Ericsson AB, 2012), accessed 17 October 2014, http://11
www.ericsson.com/res/docs/2012/myanmar-report-2012-13nov.pdf.
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now sold for 1,500 kyats (US$1.50) at a number of 
Ooredoo outlets cropping up across Yangon, 
Mandalay and Naypyidaw. Together, these three 
cities represent a potential market of 7.8 million 
people. Sales of Ooredoo and Telenor prepaid 
service cards will also provide a much needed 
boost to small informal shops run by local entre-
preneurs. When coverage eventually reaches rur-
al areas, Myanmar’s farmers, which represent 70 
percent of its workforce, will be able to sell crops, 
buy seeds and equipment and secure micro-loans 
through mobile banking networks. 
❖ An evolving banking sector. As part of the on-
going reforms, the Hluttaw has also overhauled 
Myanmar’s antiquated banking sector, paving the 
way for the country to re-enter the global econo-
my. The Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM) Law 
passed in July 2013 granted the central bank op-
erational autonomy from the Ministry of Com-
merce, as per the recommendation of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF). Also at the IMF’s 
prodding, the CBM abolished the official fixed 
exchange rate and floated the kyat.  The gov12 -
ernment has approved plans to clear the almost 
US$1 billion in combined debt owed to the World 
Bank and Asian Development Bank and has ap-
proached Standard Chartered to pass a credit 
rating for the country, potentially opening Myan-
mar to global bond buyers. 
At the time of this writing, the Hluttaw is working 
on a bill clarifying rules for joint ventures between 
local and foreign banks. In September 2014, 
Myanmar awarded 9 licenses to financial institu-
tions in the Asia-Pacific region, including Japan’s 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Sumitomo Mitsui 
Financial Group and Mizuho Financial Group, 
Singapore-based UOB and OCBC, ICBC of China, 
Thailand’s Bangkok Bank, Malaysia’s Maybank and 
Australia-based ANZ. Each bank is required to 
bring with it at least US$75 million in capital.   13
Still, retail banking for individuals and SMEs re-
mains elusive. The World Bank estimated that in 
2012 there were only 1.9 commercial banking 
outlets per 100,000 adults in Myanmar.  The IFC 14
has proposed that less than 20 percent of the 
population currently has access to financial ser-
vices.  Local entrepreneurs and small-medium 15
enterprises (SMEs) are simply unable to secure 
loans from the traditional banking system and rely 
instead on a mixture of microfinance institutions 
and informal loan companies to secure startup 
capital. The IFC recently announced that it will 
allocate 5 to 10 licenses for SME loans to local 
banks by the end of October 2014. It has already 
awarded US$5 million for SME loans (with 
promises of up to US$30 million in the following 
years) to Yoma Bank.  16
❖ Development projects, land disputes and anti-
China sentiment. Myanmar has signed an array of 
trade agreements with foreign companies with 
the goal of developing the country’s infrastructure 
and heavy industry, but several projects have 
been stalled or cancelled due to land disputes 
between the locals and the government. In June 
2013, the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA) agreed to provide approximately 
US$500 million in loans to fund the construction 
of a special economic zone (SEZ) and deep sea 
port at the village of Thilawa, 25 km south of Yan-
gon.  China is also eager to develop Myanmar’s 17
vast natural resources, having received conces-
sions to build a copper mine at Letpadaung in 
Sagaing division. 
  In 2011, the official exchange rate was 6 kyats : 1 USD. Black market rates hovered around 1000 kyats : 1 USD.12
 Michael Peel, ‘Myanmar opens doors to foreign banks’, Financial Times, 1 October 2014, accessed 17 October 2014, http://www.ft.com/13
intl/cms/s/0/5bc39bb8-494e-11e4-8d68-00144feab7de.html#axzz3GYlEKnnf.
 ‘World Development Indicators’, World Bank Website, accessed 17 October 2014,  http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/5.5.14
 IFC Advisory Services in East Asia and the Pacific, 2013, Microfinance in Myanmar: Sector Assessment, by Eric Duflos, Paul Luchtenburg, Li 15
Ren and Li Yan Chen, http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/Microfinance%20in%20Myanmar%20Sector%20Assessment.pdf (Accessed 21 
September 2014).
 Shibani Mahtani, ‘Myanmar’s Small Businesses Targeted by World Bank Lending’, Wall Street Journal, 16 September 2014, accessed 17 16
October 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/myanmars-small-businesses-targeted-by-world-bank-loan-1410861135?KEYWORDS=myan-
mar+ifc.
 ‘ODA Loan Agreements Signed with the Republic of the Union of Myanmar’, JICA press release, 7 June 2013, accessed 17 October 2014, 17
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2013/130607_01.html.
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A murky system of land deeds left over from the 
Ne Win and SPDC-eras has led to current dis-
putes, with locals contending that they sold land 
to the then-military government under duress, 
and the government arguing that it is only liable 
to compensate villagers for housing and crops. 
Several villagers from Thilawa have staged 
protests in Yangon demanding that the govern-
ment provide additional compensation or else 
reverse its decision to develop the Japanese-
sponsored SEZ. In May 2014, angry villagers in 
Letpadaung kidnapped two Chinese contractors 
involved with the mine and issued similar de-
mands.  
The government has at times given in to pro-
testors’ demands. After widespread demonstra-
tions in 2011, President Thein Sein suspended 
construction of the Chinese-backed Myitsone 
hydroelectric dam in Kachin State for the remain-
der of his term. The government also recently 
shelved an ambitious Chinese rail project linking 
southwestern Yunnan province to the Irrawaddy 
delta. 
Finally, international observers and human rights 
organisations are concerned that anger surround-
ing Chinese infrastructure projects could indicate 
a return to the anti-Chinese pogroms Burma ex-
perienced in the mid-1960s. There are over 1.6 
million ethnic Chinese currently living in Myanmar 
today, constituting three per cent of the total 
population. 
❖ Renewed ethnic tensions and the Nationwide 
Ceasefire Agreement. Over the last 25 years, the 
Tatmadaw has negotiated ceasefires with nearly 
all armed insurgent groups operating within the 
country, but lasting peace still remains elusive. 
After 17 years of relative peace, conflict between 
the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and 
the military resumed in June 2011, partly because 
increased Chinese interest in the northern state 
had raised the stakes for autonomy. The Tat-
madaw has also recently clashed with the Shan 
State Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army 
(TNLA) and the Karen National Liberation Army 
(KNLA).   18
As of this writing, leaders from 16 ethnic rebel 
groups, including the KIO and the KNLA, are 
meeting with government representatives from 
the Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) in the Kachin 
town of Laiza with the intention of reaching a Na-
tionwide Ceasefire Agreement. It still remains to 
be seen how the reformed government would 
integrate ethnic minorities such as the Kachin into 
greater Myanmar, or whether it would grant them 
limited autonomy under a federal structure. In the 
meantime, Myanmar’s lawless northern border, 
including parts of Kachin and the United Wa 
States continue to act as a haven for smugglers 
and poachers. 
❖ Sectarian violence in Rakhine and Mandalay. 
Although tensions between Myanmar’s Buddhists 
and Muslims have existed since colonial times, 
violence  between the two groups has flared since 
liberalisation in 2011. In 2012 and early 2013, 
reports that a Buddhist Rakhine woman had been 
assaulted and murdered by a group of Muslim 
youths led to rioting and reprisals throughout the 
Rakhine State, resulting in 192 deaths, 265 injuries 
and the destruction of 8,614 homes.  Large 19
numbers of Rohingya Muslims, fleeing the vio-
lence, were forced into refugee camps along the 
Bangladesh border. The Burmese government 
maintains that the Rohingyas are il legal 
Bangladeshi migrants and that it bears limited 
responsibility for their welfare. In February 2014, 
the government went as far to suspend Médecins 
Sans Frontières from operating in Rakhine State, 
citing the fact that the international aid group had 
failed to remain “impartial” in the ongoing 
Rakhine-Rohingya conflict. This has left up to 
750,000 ethnic Rohingyas living in the refugee 
camps without access to adequate healthcare.   20
Sectarian violence has also spread beyond 
Rakhine state to Yangon and Mandalay, where 
 Nyein Nyein, ‘Nationwide Ceasefire Hangs in the Balance at Rebel Meeting’, The Irrawaddy, 18 July 2014, accessed October 17 2014, 18
http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/nationwide-ceasefire-hangs-balance-rebel-meeting.html.
 Maetrii Aung-Thwin, “Myanmar in 2013,” 209.19
 Jane Perlez, ‘Ban on Doctors’ Group Imperils Muslim Minority in Myanmar’, New York Times, 13 March 2014, accessed 17 October 2014, 20
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/world/asia/myanmar-bans-doctors-without-borders.html.
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both Indian and Chinese Muslims (Panthay) have 
been the target of violence stoked by extremist 
monk Ashin Wirathu and his anti-Muslim 969 
movement. In July 2014, a Buddhist mob attacked 
and killed a Panthay man in Mandalay after 
Wirathu posted a fabricated story on Facebook 
alleging that a Buddhist woman had been as-
saulted by a group of Muslim men. Wirathu was 
released from prison in 2011 as part of the gov-
ernment's amnesty of political prisoners.  
Recently, the violence and resulting refugee crisis 
has taken on a regional dimension, with large 
numbers of Rohingya migrating, often illegally, to 
Malaysia through Thailand. Reuters reporters Ja-
son Szep and Andrew Marshall were awarded the 
2014 Pulitzer Prize for their reporting on the Thai 
government’s involvement in selling detained 
Rohingya migrants to human traffickers.  Bud21 -
dhist Burmese migrant workers have also become 
a target of reprisals in Muslim-majority Malaysia.  22
❖ 2015 elections and constitutional reform. The 
international community is collectively holding its 
breath for the slated November 2015 general 
elections, which are largely seen as a barometer 
of Myanmar’s future suitability for business. Any 
reports of electoral discrepancies in November 
would undermine much of the optimism behind 
the political reforms and could possibly lead to a 
renewal of sanctions by Western governments. 
U.S. companies in particular have largely held 
back from making commitments until the ground 
settles. 
Also up for review is the country’s 2008 Constitu-
tion. The government appointed a constitutional 
review committee in December 2013 that will 
make recommendations for changes to the doc-
ument in February 2015. Points of interest include 
Article 436, which reserves 25 percent of seats in 
the Hluttaw for military representatives, and Arti-
cle 59(f), which bars individuals with foreign fami-
ly members, such as Aung San Suu Kyi, from be-
coming President. After decades of military sup-
pression, the opposition still views the govern-
ment and its reforms with suspicion, and this atti-
tude will likely continue until the Tatmadaw relin-
quishes its 25 percent control of the legislature.  
❖ Continuing press regulations. The Ministry of 
Information’s Press Scrutiny and Registration Divi-
sion (PSRD) relaxed its regulations and instituted 
a licensing scheme in place of direct censorship 
in 2012, but Burmese media organisations con-
tinue to work under considerable checks from the 
government. The licensing scheme has allowed 
for the creation of several independent media 
organisations, such as the satellite provider 
SkyNet, as well as the return of expatriate publica-
tions, such as Mizzima. Still, the PSRD has retained 
the power to allocate, suspend or revoke licenses 
as it sees fit, effectively perpetuating its role as 
gatekeeper. 
The government continues to use several colo-
nial-era laws, including the 1923 Burma State Se-
crets Act and the 1950 Emergency Act, to prose-
cute journalists. On 7 April 2014, a regional court 
sentenced Democratic Voice of Burma reporter 
Zaw Pe, who was reporting on a Japanese schol-
arship fund, to one year in prison for “trespassing” 
and “disturbing a civil servant.” In February 2014, 
after reporting on an alleged chemical weapons 
factory in Magwe Region, four local journalists 
from Unity Weekly were arrested and charged 
under the 1923 act.  
C. Insights from the Yangon Lab 
❖ Because Yangon lacks local mid-tier funding, 
entrepreneurs find it difficult to scale.  
There are already several organisations in Yangon, 
including Ideabox, Project Hub, Opportunities 
Now, EDNA, and Building Markets, which award 
startup funding in the form of loans or grants to 
local entrepreneurs, but none of these organisa-
tions provide mid-tier funding in the US$50,000 
to US$200,000 range. The maximum amount of 
individual funding a local Burmese entrepreneur 
can access from any of these organisations is US
 Jason Szep and Andrew Marshall, ‘Special Report - Thailand secretly dumps Myanmar refugees into trafficking rings’, Reuters, 5 December 21
2013, accessed 17 October 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/12/05/uk-thailand-rohingya-special-report-idUKBRE9B400920131205.
 Stuart Grudgings, ‘Four dead as Myanmar violence spills into Malaysia’, Reuters, 5 June 2013, accessed 17 October 2014, http://22
www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/05/us-malaysia-myanmar-violence-idUSBRE9540BA20130605.
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$2,000 - too little to effectively scale a small busi-
ness. 
One potential ray of light is the ongoing banking 
reforms and entrance of foreign financial institu-
tions into Myanmar. The IFC recently announced a 
partnership with Yoma Bank that will provide US
$5 million in loans for the country’s SME owners. 
In total, the IFC plans to establish between five 
and ten partnerships with local banks.  
❖ In order to scale, social enterprises and civil 
society groups require the help of foreign donors, 
which gives international founders a distinct 
funding advantage over local counterparts. 
Social enterprises in Yangon face a similar scarcity 
of local mid-tier funding, forcing them to turn to 
overseas donations and grants. Of the social en-
terprises interviewed, all received substantial mid-
tier funding through large foreign organisations. 
Proximity Designs is the recipient of several in-
ternational grants, including grants from the San 
Francisco-based Mulago Foundation, while Yan-
gon Bakehouse was recently awarded an Asia 
Foundation grant. Incubator Project Hub Yangon 
receives partial funding from USAID for its ADEPT 
programme at the Yangon Institute of Economics.  
All of the social enterprises interviewed for this 
report were founded and led by expatriates work-
ing in Myanmar. Foreign-born social entrepre-
neurs employ professional grant writers and pos-
sess the necessary savvy and connections to ap-
ply for overseas funding. They exercise a signifi-
cant advantage over local entrepreneurs, espe-
cially those outside the Anglophone corporate 
world. 
At the moment, Myanmar has only a few funds 
available to local social entrepreneurs and civil 
society leaders. The British Council, via its Amatae 
programme, provides medium-sized startup 
grants of up to £200,000 (US$320,000) to civil 
society organisations. Social venture capital firm 
Insitor Management has also made recent inroads 
into the country. Insitor currently provides funding 
to SIOs operating in Cambodia and India and 
plans to begin providing similar seed funding to 
social startups in Myanmar within the next 2 to 3 
years. 
One notable exception to the above rule is the 
Free Funeral Service Society (FFSS), one of 
Myanmar’s largest local civil society groups. FFSS, 
which provides medical and educational services 
to Yangon communities, operates entirely on local 
donations and has even refused past offers of 
foreign aid. As a Buddhist charity organisation, it 
has been able to draw on donations from reli-
gious individuals. 
❖ Pressure to be sustainable in the absence of an 
existing SME banking sector has led many organ-
isations to establish their own in-house microcre-
dit programmes. 
Self-sustainability has become a buzzword among 
the social enterprise and nonprofit communities 
in recent years, driving many social impact organ-
isations to explore alternative funding models. 
The IFC estimates that demand for microcredit in 
Myanmar is close to US$1 billion, but that current 
supply falls far short at only US$283 million.  23
With Myanmar banks currently unable or unwill-
ing to finance small business or crop loans, sever-
al organisations have instituted their own in-
house microcredit programmes. Organisations 
that operate microloan programmes included 
Opportunities Now, which has provided loans of 
up to US$2000 to startups and SMEs in Yangon 
since 2012, and Proximity Designs, which pro-
vides small crop loans to farmers at 2.5 percent 
interest per season. 
At the time of writing, Opportunities Now and 
Proximity Designs have yet to expand their micro-
credit operations to the volume necessary to fully 
sustain their operating budget. Both organisa-
tions continue to rely on outside funding for their 
core programmes. ON receives online donations, 
while PD keeps afloat via various grants. Proceeds 
from microfinance are generally used to fund new 
programmes, while core programmes continue to 
run off traditional grants. 
 IFC Advisory Services in East Asia and the Pacific, 2013, Microfinance in Myanmar: Sector Assessment, by Eric Duflos, Paul Luchtenburg, Li 23
Ren and Li Yan Chen, http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/Microfinance%20in%20Myanmar%20Sector%20Assessment.pdf (Accessed 21 
September 2014).
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❖The current education system in Myanmar is 
overly focused on credentials, placing a premi-
um on certifications at the expense of concrete 
skills or experience. 
Instead of representing skills attained, Burmese 
degrees and certifications are very often em-
ployed as their own currency. Credentials from 
academic institutions are coveted by young grad-
uates, who will continue to amass an array of certi-
fications, including accounting, management and 
leadership courses, well after graduation. Many 
Burmese see credentials as a ticket to high-pres-
tige jobs in local businesses or the government, 
but they are also important bargaining chips in 
other aspects of life, such as marriage arrange-
ments. 
After over a half-century of mismanagement, 
Burmese universities, once the most prestigious 
in Southeast Asia, are today largely dysfunctional. 
Courses are poorly taught, and “soft skills,” such 
as critical thinking and problem solving, are rarely 
imparted. Undergraduates choose their course of 
study based solely on high school exit-exam re-
sults, leaving large numbers of students to read 
subjects for which they have little to no aptitude. 
Companies interviewed, both local and foreign, 
expressed their frustration with the current sys-
tem, citing the difficulty they encounter staffing 
their own offices. With the economy growing at a 
brisk 6.7 percent annually, Myanmar is simply 
unable to provide enough skilled personnel local-
ly to fill the rapidly expanding number of man-
agement positions opening up across all sectors. 
Local graduates, despite impressive CVs, possess 
little to no practical skills or experience and must 
be trained on-site, after which they are suscepti-
ble to poaching from rivals. Employers over-
whelmingly prefer repatriate Myanmar, but in re-
cent years the sheer demand for talent has ex-
hausted the supply of overseas graduates. 
Finally, social enterprises face a similar dearth of 
hard management skills. Social entrepreneurs 
who are able to dream up innovative and trans-
formative solutions do not necessarily possess the 
day-to-day business know-how to ensure that 
their operation runs as effectively as a well-oiled 
corporate machine. Yangon Bakehouse, for in-
stance, responded that their chief need was for 
qualified accountants. 
❖ Local civil society organisations are divided 
along political lines, and participation in a CSO 
programme can be construed as a political 
statement. 
The previous military government’s policies be-
tween 1988 and 2011 have left the country divid-
ed, often bitterly, in two between supporters of 
the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Par-
ty (USDP) and Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD. There is a 
discernible lack of trust between the government 
and certain civil society groups, with several CSOs 
providing social services to the opposition, as 
opposition members are reluctant to use gov-
ernment services. 
The Free Funeral Service Society, headquartered 
in North Dagon, began as a charity providing free 
mortuary services, FFSS and its founders have 
received significant political attention from both 
Aung San Suu Kyi and pro-sanction American 
politicians such as John McCain. Today FFSS pro-
vides a range of social services independent of 
the government, including a school, a clinic, am-
bulances and garbage disposal trucks. Burmese 
who are unable or unwilling to utilise government 
services due to their affiliation with the opposition 
often choose to utilise FFSS services in lieu.  
On the other hand, the government has also en-
couraged its own brood of CSOs, often headed 
by retired government officials. ISL interviewed 
several senior staff of government sponsored 
CSOs, all of whom criticised rival civil society ef-
forts as “redundant” and discouraged ISL from 
engaging with CSOs that had originated outside 
of the government. 
❖ The political and economic reforms are promis-
ing, but Myanmar’s infrastructure needs to catch 
up before the country can become a viable busi-
ness prospect. 
Although there is a general feeling that the politi-
cal situation will not return to that of pre-2011, 
Myanmar still has a long road ahead of it in terms 
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of building a functioning regulatory government 
capable of nurturing foreign investment. In 2011 
and 2012, amid all the excitement of the country’s 
opening up, many foreign firms rushed into the 
country to set up offices. They are only now be-
ginning to realise the magnitude of the problems 
the country faces and the challenges of doing 
business there. 
Infrastructure, including roads, mass transit, water 
supply and housing, is vastly outdated, rendering 
shipping and distribution lines difficult to estab-
lish. According to the Asian Development Bank, 
Myanmar has only 40 km of road for every 1,000 
sq km. By comparison, Thailand and Vietnam have 
350 km and 480 km respectively.  Due to sheer 24
lack of supply, office space rents at nearly US$95 
per square meter, the highest in the region.  Few 25
if any multinationals that have opened up offices 
in Myanmar are in the black at the moment, pri-
marily due to soaring operating costs. One corpo-
rate professional interviewed estimated that it 
would take another three to five years until 
Myanmar's business sector could take off. 
 ‘Myanmar in Transition: Opportunities and Challenges’, Manila: Asian Development Bank, August 2012, accessed 17 October 2014, http://24
www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/2012/myanmar-in-transition.pdf.
 Michael Peel, ‘Myanmar property prices surge as country opens up to investment’, Financial Times, 23 October 2013, accessed 17 October 25
2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/90be8c0c-3bb6-11e3-b85f-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3GYlEKnnf.
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V. List of Organisations Interviewed 
AIESEC. Yangon, 4 August 2014. 
Asian Development Bank. Yangon, 5 August 2014. 
Aung Pin Lae. Yangon, 5 August 2014. 
Border Areas Development Association. Singapore, 17 July 2014 and Yangon, 5 August 2014.  
The British Council. Yangon, 4 August and 16 September 2014. 
Building Markets. Yangon, 16 September 2014. 
Capacity Building Initiative. Yangon, 5 August 2014.  
Co-operative Bank Ltd. Yangon, 5 August and 16 September 2014. 
Dagon University. Yangon, 5 August and 17 September 2014. 
Department of Basic Education. Yangon, 5 August 2014. 
Entrepreneurship Development Network Asia. Yangon, 4 August and 15 September 2014. 
Free Funeral Service Society. Yangon, 5 August 2014. 
Forest Resource Env. Development and Conservation Assoc. Yangon, 5 August 2014. 
General Electric. Yangon, 6 August 2014. 
Hamsa Hub. Singapore, 1 September 2014 and Yangon, 16 September 2014. 
Ideabox by Ooredoo. Yangon, 4 August and 16 September 2014. 
Indigo Energy. Yangon, 4 August 2014. 
Khayay and Khayay. Yangon, 15 September 2014. 
KPMG. Singapore, 30 July 2014 and Yangon, 6 August 2014. 
Myanmar Compassion Project. Yangon, 6 August 2014. 
Myanmar Peace Center. Yangon, 5 August 2014.  
Myanmar People Forum. Yangon, 5 August 2014. 
Opportunities Now Myanmar. Singapore, 19 July 2014 and Yangon, 4 August 2014. 
Partnership for Change. Yangon, 15 September 2014. 
Project Hub Yangon. Yangon, 16 September 2014. 
Proximity Designs. Yangon, 15 September 2014.  
PS Business School. Yangon, 4 August 2014. 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Pyinya Sanyae Institute of Education. Singapore, 29 July 2014. 
The Sun Institute. Yangon, 4 August 2014. 
Vriens and Partners. Yangon, 4 August 2014. 
West Yangon University. Yangon, 5 August 2014. 
Yangon Bakehouse. Yangon, 4 August and 15 September 2014. 
YOMA Strategic Holdings Ltd. Yangon, 4 and 5 August 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
VI. Questions for Interviewees 
Organisational History  
1) How and why was your organisation established? Is there a founding story? 
2) For international organisations – Why did your organisation decide to enter Myanmar?  
Operations  
3) On what projects are you currently working? What would success look like one year from 
now? Five years from now? 
4) How successful were your past programmes? What is your organisation doing differently 
from when it first began operations in Myanmar? 
5) Do you foresee any upcoming difficulties?  
6) What does your organisation need to make your programmes more effective?  
Strategies  
7) What are your organisation’s goals for the next 3-5 years? How do you plan to meet those 
goals? 
8) What factors might jeopardise the success of your overall strategy?  
Collaboration  
9) Were there any difficulties or pitfalls in past collaborations? Have any difficulties surfaced in 
your current collaborations?  
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ORGANISATIONS BY SECTOR
Media & Academia
4
Commercial
9
Government
3
SIO
17 SIO SUB-SECTORS
Incubators
4
Social Ent.
4
Corporate Phil.
1
Nonprofits
8
Tot l Organi ations Inte viewed: 33 
SIO: 17 
 Nonprofits: 8 
 Social Enterprises: 4 
 Incubators: 4 
 C rporate Foundations: 1 
Government: 3 
Commercial: 9 
Media & Academia: 4
10) Have you collaborated with organisations outside your sector? How could such rela-
tionships be improved or facilitated?  
11) Is there any individual or organisation with whom you would like to collaborate but have 
been unable to do so?  
Human Resources  
12) Do you generally source staff locally or from overseas? Have you had any difficulties finding 
skilled local staff?  
13) Which professional skills, if any, do local staff currently lack? What do local staff need to 
succeed in today’s workplace?  
14) How would you evaluate local educational institutions in preparing future employees? Are 
there private or foreign institutions attempting to fill any gaps?  
Leadership  
15) What does effective leadership—in business, government or civil society—look like to you? 
16) What skills and resources do Myanmar leaders need to better serve their society?  
17) The Institute broadly defines societal leadership as “the practice of creating sustainable 
value and impact for the betterment of society within one’s sphere of influence.” Are there 
any remarkable individuals in Myanmar whom you would consider a societal leader? 
Sustainability & CSR 
18) Does you organisation have any sustainability guidelines? How did you determine your 
current guidelines? 
19) Does your organisation engage in any Corporate Social Responsibility  (CSR) initiatives? 
Have you been able to measure the impact of your organisation’s CSR programmes? 
Funding (for civic-sector organisations) 
20) Roughly speaking, how is your organisation currently funded?  
21) How financially self-sustaining is your organisation at the moment? Do you have any plans 
to lower dependence on outside funding in the future? 
Context  
22) How does working in Myanmar differ from working in other Southeast Asian countries? 
What does Myanmar have in common with the rest of the region?  
23) How do minorities (ethnic, religious, or otherwise) fit into the landscape? Do minorities 
actively collaborate with the status quo?  
24) Outside of your own organisation’s scope, what are the key problem areas facing 
Myanmar?  
25) How is Myanmar different from five years ago? How do you imagine it will change in the 
next five years?  
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